On Tuesday, 1 March, i attended an event organised by the
Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of Westminster. The seminar, entitled
"The Politics of Affect: Discourse and Jouissance", featured Dr. Yannis Stavrakakis, who as i mentioned
before is a leading expert on psychoanalysis, discourse and politics.
Although i missed trains, got lost etc i managed to get there at 14:15. I was actually quite worried that i wouldn't be able to follow the talk because, while i'm fascinated by the topic of emotions and discourse in politics and have done some reading on it, psychoanalysis as such is not exactly my field and it's still a very challenging and intellectually stimulating area. However, Yannis has an amazing capacity to communicate efficiently the most complex and abstract ideas, so by the end of the talk i felt like i was an expert!!
The talk related to a lot of the stuff we've been working on at Bournemouth, such as populism, nationalism and political rhetoric, the role of the emotional in democracy, collective identities and structuralism / post-structuralism - so it was really useful. Prof. Chantal Mouffe, one of the most important political philosophers in the world today, chaired the event. As promised, here are my notes from the seminar [and it goes without saying that if you spot inconsistencies or mistakes, or if you just want to add your questions and thoughts, please feel free to use the comment function].
The core theme in Dr. Stavrakakis’ talk is the distinction between the affective/emotional and the discursive/symbolic (and its application in politics). Yannis examined the three periods in
Lacan’s thought:
1st period: focus on the ‘symbolic’
2nd period: the ‘real’ is restored
3rd period: synthesis and interpenetration of the two elements, which leads Lacan to a series of neologisms that try to fuse the discursive with the real, e.g. his notion of a pre-linguistic, pre-symbolic language.
Initially, Lacan was criticised for reducing affectivity to a linguistic/discursive exercise (i.e. the affective can only be approached through the symbolic). His main effort was to demonstrate the constitutivity of the discursive. Lacan aimed to highlight the linguistic semiotic aspects of the Freudian revolution. This signifying reduction does not stop Lacan from producing the ‘remainder’ that fails to receive attention at other processes of representation. Stavrakakis notes that Freud is unclear on these issues; depending on which text you read you end up with a different conclusion; there is a dualism, a more complex tangled relation.
However (and this is were it gets bloody), If ‘affect’ exists before representation [i.e. to put it simply, if pure ‘feeling’ can be expressed prior to symbols and language – which is what structuralists such as Saussure basically argue, albeit in different interpretations] that creates a problem for Lacan’s model. At this point Yiannis notes a fascinating paradox: we want to talk about something that is extra-discursive (pre-linguistic situation, “pre-symbolic energetic substratum”), but we can only do that through discourse, i.e. through a set of symbols. It’s like trying to do discursive analysis on something that exists at the limits of discursivity.
So what is Lacan’s solution for this vicious circle?
He’s traversing his own universe of all encompassing symbolic, a universe of discourse evident in his early teachings (First Period), moving to the completely opposite direction (Second Period). Now, it’s important to look for the Real, to look for
jouissance [French word for ‘enjoyment’ but with a primitive, carnal slant], which is the opposite of constructed discourse.
Stavrakakis argues that the end of this process in the Lacanian theory is very important for political analysis too. The notion of “jouissance” can alter the analysis of nationalism:
- it is the affective bonds that characterise national, collective bonds;
- nations inspire love and often demand sacrifice;
- the mobilisation of political resources has to be coupled with affective dimensions;
- thus, the national/collective cannot be defined as merely symbolic.
[Note to self: but isn’t the distinction between affective/symbolic an artificial one, echoing the faux distinction between emotional/rational? Or am I an “affective determinist”? But again, Stavrakakis makes that distinction for analytical purposes – see below].
According to the Freudian model, libido goes with aggression: you can create a bond amongst a group of people only if there is an “outsider” (group or individual).
[Note to self: this is one of the most important features of human nature; every group is defined not only by what it is, but also by what it is not; this is obvious in populist, racist and conspiracy rhetoric based on anger and fear about the unknown / corrupt / lethal outsider or insider].
[Thus, we can infer that jouissance / enjoyment / the affective requires the existence of “the other”.]
Stavrakakis then demonstrates that through a simple but strong example: the way we relate to each other is by identifying common ways of enjoyment (food, customs, celebrations etc: i.e. jouissance) which is especially marked when foreigners consider it as disgusting. Thus, concludes Yannis, the symbolic (linguistic / rhetorical / discursive / constructed / cultural) aspect is not sufficient to analyse nationalism: every identification is bound to produce the obscene otherness, which is hated for stealing our national enjoyment (which is never enough). Enjoyment is crucial in constructing national identification but it’s never enough; there is a part of the enjoyment, which is always missing; enter *symbolic* means covering that little coveted segment that’s never there.
[Note to self: the same applies to contemporary advertising, marketing and branding communications, which always promise to deliver that elusive extra, which as soon as you obtain the product disappears and reappears as the next product. Yannis rightly notes that the enjoyment is not so much in acquiring the product, but in the act of coveting itself].
Stavrakakis then gives a couple of examples, one from the former Yugoslavia and the other from Greece. According to a Greek sociologist (Tsoukalas), the traditional notion of “Greekness” is characterised by the values of communion, pathos, honour, traditions, contradiction, feasts: these are boosting experiences of the collective. In that sense, anti-Greekness is defined by rational self-centred success.
[However, as Yannis is talking about this I’m thinking about the rise of reality television and talent shows, and the age-old fundamental importance of *fame* in the Greek public sphere. Being famous, having your achievements celebrated within the broader community - on national television preferably – is the highest ideal of the Greek society; if you’re on TV you’ve made it. Thus, I’m not sure I agree with the view that self-centred success is viewed as anti-Greek; perhaps the *intention* of individualistic success should not be obvious, but there is definitely a mix-up here between the symbolic and the affective: the achievements of an athlete from an obscure Greek village, and his/her subsequent interview on primetime network TV, creates both a symbolic and an affective catharsis for the local and national community as was the case during last year’s European football championship – was that symbolic or affective??].
Anyway, the point is that national discourse needs to provide a convincing explanation for the lack or theft of full enjoyment (the public notices that it can never receive the full enjoyment from a collective – or indeed individual – experience, and the state or whoever else is managing that collective experience, needs to account for the lost segment).
Stavrakakis then mentions two case studies on populism on which he’s worked recently. The first focuses on the Greek Church discourse during the Government/Church conflict over the display of religion on ID cards. As it has been noted before, religion is inextricably related to the Greek national identity and Yannis’ analysis of the Church’s rhetoric reveals key elements of populist discourse:
a) the people were the nodal point / signifier (the Archbishop addressed them highlighting how they are being threatened).
b) There was a dichotomical organisation of the political space (good v. evil).
There is something *beyond* the discursive analysis, which has to do with the *investment* of this discourse. Is this emotional element spontaneous or constructed and tactical?
The second study mentioned by Yannis is the case of EU identity, more specifically the failure of the European Union’s institutions to build the ideal identity. He argues that one of the reasons for this failure is that the way this identity has been constructed is very ‘dry’ and technocratic and does not address the other (affective / emotional side).
I’m not actually sure I agree with that observation – and what is perhaps implied by Yannis. First of all, identity (even a not so successful one) cannot exist in an emotional vacuum – thus, even if the affective side has not been “looked after” it still exists somehow; ‘dryness’ is still an affective state (a not so pleasant one, but an affective state nonetheless). One cannot even be sure that that lack of “affective-ness” is accidental or due to strategic failure. Perhaps it is the vision of those who shaped the European Union to build a seemingly un-affective identity, which is consistent to the core European ideals of tolerance, integration and cosmopolitanism. Perhaps, given that a necessary condition for the existence of any identity – especially an affective one – is the existence of ‘the other’, it’s better that we don’t have a strong European identity [and here I’m just thinking out loud, it doesn’t mean I even agree with this argument] because it would create new “fortresses” (…).
Stavrakakis contrasts the failed attempts of the EU to construct an emotionally invested European identity to
The Sun’s rhetoric over EU, which is very successful in terms of populism (i.e. the key narrative is that the EU threatens to steal British jouissance etc). Yannis ends his talk with a disclaimer that these are only some of the distinctions and concepts in Lacan’s thought and there are other equally important ones, such as the one between *phallic* jouissance (culturally dominant, macho, aggressive) v. *feminine* jouissance (more cosmopolitan and peaceful).
The seminar then opens to the floor for questions. [I have tried to summarise the main ones here. Please note this is neither a verbatim transcription of what was said, nor are points presented in the order that they were originally made – I have simplified things so as to make better sense].
Q: ‘Nation’ is different from ‘nationalism’, yet you use them interchangeably.
YS: Both concepts refer to the process of social construction, so at the level of abstraction required for this paper they are used interchangeably (although differences are acknowledged).
Q: There seems to be a contradiction between affective essentialisation and disessentialisation in your talk. You speak of the affect as ontological, outside of language - while other times you treat affect as alterable and constructed, i.e. there is no passion etc. thus you reject the dualism.
YS: All elements are both ontological and contingent; they are there but *the way they are there* takes different forms. The relation between lack and excess is relevant here; a continuous dialectic that destabilises the dualism. There is no way to avoid essentialism; if you reject affective essentialism you must then subscribe to linguistic essentialism.
Q: What is the status of the normative in your analysis?
YS: Feminine jouissance may be the ethical way forward [i.e. – Roman’s reading – a better balance between the two enjoyments].
Q: How about cosmopolitanism (rather than nationalism)? Is cosmopolitanism or metropolitanism based on the exclusion and rejection of ‘the other’?
YS: There still must be a dialectical relationship with a subtle/subconscious ‘otherness’ that is not based on contingency.
And at that point, when I’m thinking “this is it, I got it, I have a good grasp of the whole thing” comes the denouement a la Hitchcock. Stavrakakis concludes with the observation that the concept of “Before” and the “Real” is, in fact, [wait – are you ready for this?] it is, in fact, fictional! We don’t *really* know what’s there. The symbolic is ‘before’, but because we can’t define the symbolic we try to find substitutes [whoa, that sounds like the (post-structuralist) enemy within (structuralism)!!!]
As for the binary distinction between the affective and the symbolic, Yannis observes that If you don’t accept duality then you can’t distinguish between discourses that are relatively more heavily invested vis-à-vis jouissance with others [thus as I mentioned before, duality is an analytical tool rather than a clear-cut Manichean distinction].
